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N the past decade alternative dispute resolution has been transformed in
many jurisdictions from a voluntary process independent of the courts to
a mandatory, integral part of judicial procedure. Many state and federal
courts have adopted rules requiring parties to go through some form of
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ADRI as a prerequisite to a trial.2 This annexation of ADR by courts raises
questions both as to the wisdom of court-mandated ADR and, if it is man-
dated, as to what form of participation should be required in the ADR pro-
ceeding. The first of those questions is related to the long-standing debate
over the virtues of adjudication versus settlement,3 as well as more recent
expressions of concern over the co-opting of ADR through integration into
1. "ADR" is used in this article to refer to all non-binding alternative dispute resolution
processes utilizing third party neutrals that are invoked to encourage settlement. It does not
include binding arbitration or private judging, which are essentially forms of extrajudicial "ad-
judication." Although their procedures differ, ADR processes share the common objective of
aiding the parties to make an objective evaluation of their cases, to appreciate the positions and
interests of the other side, and to explore mutually acceptable solutions. One criterion for
differentiating ADR processes is the degree of directiveness of the third-party neutral. In
"facilitative" ADR (such as traditional mediation), the neutral eschews directiveness and the
giving of opinions, while "evaluative" or "trial run" ADR processes (such as early neutral
evaluation, outcome determinative mediation, neutral fact finding, moderated settlement con-
ference, court-annexed arbitration, summary jury trial, and mini-trial) involve evaluation or a
non-binding ruling by the neutral or third parties. See infra text at accompanying notes 83-87,
for descriptions of the particular processes. These categories are not mutually exclusive, and
some hybrid processes fit into more than one category. For a detailed examination of the
various ADR processes, see STEPHEN GOLDBERG, FRANK E. A. SANDER & NANCY ROGERS,
DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND OTHER PROCESSES 103-240 (2d ed.
1992); JOHN MURRAY, ALAN RAU & EDWARD SHERMAN, DISPUTE RESOLUTION: MATERI-
ALS FOR CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION 111-3-21 (Nat.Instit. for Dis. Resol. 1992); ABCs of
ADR: A Dispute Resolution Glossary, 10 ALT. TO THE HIGH COST OF LIT. 115-118 (Aug.
1992).
2. The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 requires each U.S. district court to submit by
the end of 1993, a civil justice "expense and delay reduction plan" which requires considera-
tion of "authorization to refer appropriate cases to alternative dispute resolution programs."
28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (West Supp. 1990). Most of the early-filed plans provide for some form
of voluntary or mandatory ADR. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE RE-
FORM ACT, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. ON LITIG. 32-53. Many state courts have annexed voluntary or
mandatory ADR. COURT ADR: ELEMENTS OF PROGRAM DESIGN (Elizabeth Plapinger &
Margaret Shaw eds.) (1992). See Robert Parker & Leslie Hagin, "ADR" Techniques in the
Reformation Model of Civil Dispute Resolution, 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 1905, (1993), for a creative
ADR management model.
3. This debate has taken a number of forms. Initially, concerns were expressed that
judicial encouragement of settlement could deny parties the protection of courts, which are
best suited to protecting constitutional and public law rights, and could undermine the rights-
oriented litigation process which provides binding precedents applicable to others similarly
situated. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085-87 (1984); Harry T.
Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 675-
82 (1986). Judicial expansion of ADR has also been seen as a way for judges to impose greater
managerial control over litigation and to limit opportunities for adjudication. Judith Resnik,
Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 497-98 (1986).
Doubts have also been expressed as to the quality of ADR and its supposed efficiency. Edward
Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL. L. REV. 1, 31-47
(1987); Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76
IOWA L. REV. 889, 914-29 (1991); Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other
Methods of Alternate Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
366, 366-93 (1986). The approach taken in the Civil Justice Reform Act, supra note 2, of
encouraging ADR experimentation through district court rules has been criticized as under-
cutting the "trans-substantivity" of procedural rules and allocating judicial rulemaking to local
amateur groups. Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77
MINN. L. REV. 375, 376-82 (1992); Carl Tobias, The Transformation of Trans-Substantivity,
49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1501, 1503-04 (1992). Mediation has also been criticized as dis-
advantaging women and poor persons. Tina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dan-
gers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality:
Minimizing the Risks of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359.
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the adversary litigation system.4 This article will not attempt to resolve
those debates, 5 focusing instead on the second question - given that a court
does issue a mandatory ADR order, what are the responsibilities of the par-
ties and their attorneys to participate in the ADR proceeding?
I. THE SETTLEMENT FUNCTION OF COURT-MANDATED ADR
In determining what should be required in a court-mandated ADR pro-
ceeding, it is useful to consider what its function and objectives are when it is
annexed to the litigation system. The primary motivation of court rules
and orders incorporating ADR has clearly been the hope of achieving settle-
ment short of trial. Other benefits that ADR can have - such as exploring
underlying interests, reconciling the parties, according them emotional clo-
sure, or permitting flexibility in the agreement 6 - have been secondary in
4. The argument is made that ADR has been co-opted through "institutionalization"
and "legalization" in the adversary litigation system, resulting in the subordination of its prob-
lem-solving and relationship-building goals to cost-efficiency and docket-clearing objectives.
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation
Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR", 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 13-46 (1991) [hereinafter Menkel-
Meadow, "The Law of ADR"]. For comments on this critique, see Craig A. McEwen, Pursu-
ing Problem-Solving or Predictive Settlement, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 77, 77-88 (1991); Neil
Vidmar & Jeffrey Rice, Jury-Determined Settlements and Summary Jury Trials: Observations
About Alternative Dispute Resolution in An Adversary Culture, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89, 89-
103 (1991). A related concern is raised on the other side of the Atlantic. See Simon Roberts,
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Civil Justice: An Unresolved Relationship, 56 MOD. L. REV.
452, 462 (1993) (negotiating processes "which enjoy the authority of the court but which are
stripped of the procedural safeguards of adjudication, carry the risk of unregulated coercion
and manipulation of weaker parties by stronger ones, and of both parties by the intervener").
5. For views supportive of court-annexed ADR, see Wayne D. Brazil, Institutionalizing
ADR Programs in Courts, in EMERGING ADR ISSUES IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 52
(Frank E. A. Sander ed. 1991); Wayne D. Brazil, A Close Look at Three Court-Sponsored ADR
Programs: Why They Exist, How They Operate, What They Deliver and Whether They Threaten
Important Values, 1990 U. CI. LEGAL F. 303; Richard A. Enslen, ADR: Another Acronym, or
a Viable Alternative to the High Cost of Litigation and Crowded Court Dockets? The Debate
Commences, 18 N. M. L. REV. I (1988); Developments in "Alternative" Dispute Resolution: An
Overview, 115 F.R.D. 349, 361-74 (1987); Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost
of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 253-75 (1985). For generally favorable views of ADR, see
Robert A. Baruch Bush, Defining Quality in Dispute Resolution: Taxonomies and Anti-Taxon-
omies of Quality Arguments, 66 DENY. U. L. REV. 335 (1989); Robert A. Baruch Bush, Medi-
ation and Adjudication, Dispute Resolution and Ideology: An Imaginary Conversation, 3 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES (1989); Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424 (1986); Andrew W.
McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1985); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Confer-
ence, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485 (1985); Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70
F.R.D. 79, 111-34 (1976).
6. There are considerable differences in philosophy, procedure, and objectives among the
various kinds of ADR which effect the benefits derived from it. The concern about co-opta-
tion, see supra note 4, is primarily focused on mediation. For perceptive accounts of the medi-
ation process, see James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of
"Good Mediation'?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47 (1991); Beryl Blaustone, Training the Modern
Lawyer: Incorporating the Study of Mediation Into Required Law School Courses, 21 Sw. U. L.
Rev. 1317 (1992); Leonard L. Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29 (1982).
"Evaluative" or "trial run" forms of ADR do not usually offer the same opportunity for the
parties to communicate informally in the interests of reconciliation or emotional closure. The
subject matter of the dispute also has a considerable impact on the objectives of the process. A
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courts' motivation to institutionalize ADR. Of course, to the extent that
such other benefits make for a better settlement - for example, by resolving
a wider range of disputed issues, enhancing the quality of the settlement by
exploring options for mutual gain, and improving the likelihood that the
parties will comply with the agreement - ADR has special attraction as a
settlement device. The function of court-mandated ADR, therefore, is effi-
cient and effective settlement, and the procedures that govern its operation
should be consistent with the values and objectives of settlement within the
context of our trial-based litigation system.
This having been said, it is not to be assumed that court-annexation of an
ADR process should transform it into a mirror image of an adversary trial.
The very reason for believing that ADR might result in settlement is that it
has unique features suited to getting an agreement that are lacking in a trial.
These include the dynamics of assisted dialogue and cooperative problem-
solving, reality-testing of perceptions and positions, neutral evaluation of
strengths and weaknesses, empowering of parties to confront each other's
values and the fairness of their positions, searching for mutually beneficial
solutions, and flexibility of solutions outside the formal standards of legal
rules7 - all under the protective cloak of confidentiality.8 These features
are essential to the capacity of an ADR proceeding to achieve a settlement,
and it would be counterproductive for a court to undermine those attributes
and techniques when mandating ADR. The settlement objective of ADR as
an integral part of the litigation process is best served by adopting those
procedures governing its use that will preserve its settlement-enhancing fea-
tures, as long as not inconsistent with the values and objectives of the litiga-
tion system as a whole.
The objection will undoubtedly be made that the essence of ADR cannot
be reconciled with the objectives of the trial-based, adversary litigation sys-
tem.9 I think this view fails to appreciate that our litigation system and
ADR have a great deal in common - indeed, they are but different points
along a spectrum of dispute-resolution processes. Both place a high value on
a rational approach to dispute resolution,10 fairness of process, and the cen-
one-shot personal injury suit, for example, does not provide the same opportunity for restora-
tion of relationships as does a divorce or child custody suit, although even in the case of an
auto accident between strangers, the parties can have a need for interaction at a personal level
in a mediation that has a salutary effect on settlement. See LEONARD L. RISKIN & JAMES E.
WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 202-205 (1987).
7. See CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES
FOR RESOLVING CONFLICT 61-77 (1986); NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. McEWEN, MEDIA-
TION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE §§ 2.1-4.4; DONOVAN LEISURE NEWTON & IRVINE'S ADR
PRACTICE BOOKS §§ 6.1-8.22 (John H. Wilkinson ed. 1990); Susan S. Silbey and Sally E.
Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW & POL'Y (1986); Sandra Kaufman & George T.
Duncan, A Formal Framework for Mediator Mechanisms and Motivations, 36 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 688, 688-708 (1992).
8. See infra note 68.
9. See Menkel-Meadow, "The Law of ADR," supra note 4, at 32-45.
10. It is true that mediation places some importance on intuitive, as opposed to wholly
cognitive, approaches to problem-solving. However, research in conflict resolution indicates
that many phenomena assumed to be intuitive can be explained empirically as part of cognitive
processes. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Twersky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspec-
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trality of party autonomy. The claim that ADR is not adversary fails to
appreciate that it is "fundamentally a process of assisted negotiation."' I The
extensive literature on negotiation theory and strategy12 is central to ADR
practice, reflecting the degree to which negotiation underlies ADR. 13 That
does not mean that ADR does not utilize some very different approaches to
dispute resolution that attempt to overcome dysfunctional adversariness,14
but, on balance, those techniques can be reconciled with the litigation
system.
Concern over a mismatch between ADR and litigation stems in part from
the over-selling of ADR as a docket-clearing and cost-saving device. Some
judges have embraced mandatory ADR as the solution to their crowded
dockets with little sensitivity to the fact that obtaining a settlement is not
necessarily a sign of successful ADR. Mediation, for example, seeks a solu-
tion through the voluntary cooperation of the parties, and mediator manipu-
lation of the parties in order to achieve a settlement, without concern for the
quality of the agreement and how it was achieved, would seriously under-
mine the objectives of the process. 15 Moreover, empirical evidence as to
cost-savings of court-annexed ADR is far from clear. 16 Court-annexed
tive, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds., 1993) (discussing
optimistic overconfidence, the certainty effect, and loss aversion). Of course, intuitive insights
also play an important role in presentation of a case to a jury.
11. Kathleen W. Marcell & Patrick Wiseman, Why We Teach Law Students to Mediate,
1987 Mo. J. DIsP. RESOLUTION 77, 84.
12. See, e.g., Thomas C. Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 281
(1956); THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (2d ed. 1980); Melvin A. Ei-
senberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 637 (1976); HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION (1982).
For more popularized studies of negotiation theory and strategy, see ROGER FISHER & WIL-
LIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981)
[hereinafter FISHER & URY, GETTING To YES]; GERALD R. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIA-
TION AND SETrLEMENT (1983); ROGER FISHER & SCOTr BROWN, GETTING TOGETHER:
BUILDING A RELATIONSHIP THAT GETS TO YES (1988); WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST NO:
NEGOTIATING WITH DIFFICULT PEOPLE (1991).
13. Negotiation theory is central to mediation and other "facilitative" forms of ADR. In
an "evaluative" or "trial run" process, it is less central to the presentation of each side's case,
but still plays an important role in the negotiation that is expected to take place afterwards.
For discussion of the various types of ADR, see infra notes 83-87.
14. For example, mediation may have a transformative effect, persuading the parties
through trust and aspiration to replace strategic with cooperative behavior. See MOORE, supra
note 7, at 124-52; Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection or Empowerment and
Recognition?: The Mediator's Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 U. FLA. L. REV.
253, 269-73 (1989). Overcoming lawyers' traditional adversary training, however, is a chal-
lenge for ADR. See Marguerite Millhauser, The Unspoken Resistance to Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 29 (1987); cf Stephan Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary
System: How the Rhetoric of Swift and Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in American
Courts, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 487 (1980).
15. See generally JAY FOLBERG & ALLISON TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION (1984); MOORE, supra note 7;
NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. McEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY, PRACTICE (1989);
NANCY ROGERS & RICHARD SALEM, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO MEDIATION AND THE LAW
(1987).
16. See Dayton, supra note 3, at 894-96 (stating "claims concerning the success of ADR
have not been subjected to close empirical scrutiny"); Posner, supra note 3 (limited study
indicated no savings). But see Jay Folberg and Joshua Rosenberg, Use of ADR in California
Courts Findings & Proposals, 3 U.S.F. L. REV. 343, 388-392 (1992) (Early Neutral Evaluation
1993] 2083
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ADR, therefore, should not be seen as simply another docket-control device.
If its distinctive process is understood and respected when court-annexed, its
values and objectives need not be compromised.
There are obviously procedural differences between a trial and ADR. For
example, rules of evidence apply in a trial but not in ADR. 17 That difference
does not, however, make ADR inconsistent with ultimate resort to trial un-
less a party's trial rights would be adversely affected by being forced to par-
ticipate in ADR conducted without rules of evidence.' 8 Sometimes a
difference between ADR and trial procedure will require modifying the
ADR procedure for greater compatibility with the litigation process. For
example, discovery is generally available in litigation but not in ADR. It
may be desirable in a particular case to permit discovery in court-mandated
ADR, given that it will be allowed in the normal course of litigation and
could offer greater efficiency and fairness in the ADR proceeding. There
may be other situations when the trial procedure should be modified for
greater compatibility with ADR. For example, time-tables established in
scheduling conferences for performing various pretrial functions or the time
for ruling on pre-trial motions might be modified to enhance the effectiveness
and efficiency of a court-ordered ADR proceeding. Thus the integration of
ADR into litigation should permit some adjustment of the procedures of
either litigation or ADR to prevent incompatibility.
II. VALUES AND OBJECTIVES OF ADR IN THE TRIAL-BASED
LITIGATION SYSTEM
Under our legal system, the trial is the paradigm for formal dispute reso-
lution. 19 It is the ultimate legal mechanism to which parties may resort for
resolving disputes. Even court-mandated ADR processes are performed "in
program in federal district court for N.D. Cal. resulted in cost savings); JOSHUA ROSENBERG
& JAY FOLBERG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT
DEMONSTRATION DISTRICT: FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS, & RECOMMENDATIONS (unpub-
lished manuscript 1993) (confirming ENE cost savings); BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, FED-
ERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRICT COURTS 85-93
(1990) (about two-thirds of attorneys believed court-annexed arbitration saved time and
money); Note, Trial Techniques: A Discussion of Summary Jury Trials and the Use of Mock
Juries, 24 TORT & INSURANCE L.J. 563, 564 (1989) (high success rate in summary jury trials).
17. ADR processes also differ among themselves as to the role of rules of evidence. Rules
of evidence only pertain in a mediation to the extent that the parties want to confine their
consideration to what would be admissible at trial. However, in court-annexed arbitration,
summary jury trial, or mini-trial, which seek to provide a realistic "trial run," questions of
admissibility are much more important. For discussion of the various types of ADR, see infra
notes 83-87.
18. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 93-101, concerning situations in which
the right to trial might be adversely affected by certain ADR procedures.
19. Most of our disputes, of course, are resolved without filing suit at all or are settled
short of trial. See Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assess-
ing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 525, 526-46, 561-64 (1980-81). Only 4.7%
of the civil cases terminated in the federal courts in 1988 went to trial. REPORT OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS Table C1 at 135, Table C8 at 165 (1990). See Kevin C.
McMunigal, The Costs of Settlement. The Impact of Scarcity of Adjudication on Litigating
Lawyers, 37 UCLA L. REV. 833, 838-39 (1990).
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the shadow" of a trial in the sense that the likely trial result provides a
bench-mark for the parties' expectations and demands in the ADR
proceeding. 20
It is fundamental in determining the appropriate role of court-mandated
ADR that parties' constitutional rights to a trial by jury cannot be abro-
gated.21 Thus binding forms of ADR (such as traditional arbitration) can-
not be mandated, and the forms of ADR that courts have adopted are all
nonbinding. A corollary of the principle that the ultimate right to trial can-
not be abrogated is that if an ADR process is ordered, it must be accom-
plished in a manner that will not undermine the ultimate right to a trial.
Four basic principles can be distilled from applying the values and objec-
tives of court-mandated ADR in the trial-based litigation system.
A. AVOIDANCE OF COERCING PARTIES INTO SETTLING
If a nonbinding ADR proceeding is not to undermine the ultimate right to
a trial, parties obviously should not be "coerced" into settling. Judicial en-
couragement of settlement has long been practiced in federal and many state
courts; until the advent of the ADR movement, this was primarily accom-
plished through a settlement conference with the judge who used a combina-
20. The metaphor "bargaining in the shadow of the law," used by Professors Mnookin
and Kornhauser to describe the behavior of negotiating parties, seems equally applicable to
behavior in ADR:
Divorcing parents do not bargain over the division of family wealth and custo-
dial prerogatives in a vacuum; they bargain in the shadow of the law. The legal
rules governing alimony, child support, marital property, and custody give each
parent certain claims based on what each would get if the case went to trial. In
other words, the outcome that the law will impose if no agreement is reached
gives each parent certain bargaining chips - an endowment of sorts.
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case for
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979).
21. The Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, applicable to federal courts, guar-
antees the right of trial by jury "in Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars." U.S. CONST. amend. VII. State constitutions provide similar guaran-
tees of a jury trial in state courts. Courts have held that mandatory ADR does not violate the
right to jury trial, nor to due process, if it is nonbinding and does not materially interfere with
a later jury trial. See, e.g., In re Smith, 112 A.2d 625, 629 (Pa. 1955), appeal dismissed, Smith
v. Wissler, 350 U.S. 858 (1955) (stating that "[a]ll that is required is that the right of appeal for
the purpose of presenting the issue to a jury must not be burdened by the imposition of onerous
conditions, restrictions or regulations which would make the right practically unavailable");
Kimbrough v. Holiday Inn, 478 F. Supp. 566, 571 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (upholding compulsory,
nonbinding arbitration in cases under $50,000 as not "so burdensome or so onerous that it
interferes with the rights guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment"); New England Merchants
Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F.Supp. 712, 714 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (noting that the compulsory
arbitration program for contract disputes under $50,000 mandated by local rule did not violate
the right to trial by jury); Rhea v. Massey-Ferguson Inc., 767 F.2d 266, 268 (6th Cir. 1985)
(stating federal courts have "repeatedly upheld" mandatory arbitration procedures from 7th
Amendment challenges"). Seventh Amendment and due process challenges have been unsuc-
cessful against statutes requiring that medical malpractice claims be submitted to a review
panel prior to a jury trial, even where the panel's findings are presumptively valid in a de novo
trial. See Davison v. Sinai Hospital of Baltimore, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 778, 781 (D. Md. 1978),
aff'd, 617 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1988). Challenges also have failed when applied to statutes im-
posing sanctions, such as paying certain arbitration costs, on the party demanding a trial. In re
Smith, 112 A.2d at 630.
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tion of jaw-boning and veiled threats to move the parties towards
settlement. 22 The courts have uniformly held that such settlement proce-
dures must not have the effect of coercing the parties into settling.
In a typical case, Kothe v. Smith,23 the Second Circuit reversed sanctions
against the defendant after he refused to settle before trial (on the judge's
recommendation of a $20,000 to $30,000 settlement figure), but settled for
$20,000 after one day of trial. 24 The Second Circuit concluded that an "at-
torney should not be condemned for changing his evaluation of the case after
listening to [the opponent's] testimony during the first day of trial." 25 The
process used in Kothe was a judicial settlement conference, authorized by
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16.26 The appellate court viewed this rule
as "designed to encourage pretrial settlement discussions," but not to "im-
pose settlement negotiations on unwilling litigants."'27 "Pressure tactics to
coerce settlement," it said, "simply are not permissible."'28
Pressure tactics, of course, are often involved in settlement procedures -
either in judicial conferences or ADR. The question is when they become so
coercive that they are not permissible. The line between "coercion" and
"encouragement" of settlement is sometimes difficult to draw, but this dis-
tinction is central to resolving the form of participation required of a party in
a court-mandated ADR proceeding.
B. A FAIR PROCEEDING THAT IS EQUIVALENT TO A DAY IN COURT
If ADR is mandated as an integral part of litigation, the process used
should be consistent with the parties' ultimate right to a trial. An ADR
process that undermines the basic values of a trial should not be forced on a
party even if it might result in settlement. For example, a requirement that
parties participate in rolling dice, accompanied by a hard sell by the judge or
a third-party neutral to get them to accept the results of that roll, would be
contrary to the reasoned process that is inherent in our trial-based litigation
system. Similarly, an ADR process should not materially affect a party's
rights and legitimate strategies if a trial is ultimately held. 29
Compatibility with the trial system does not, of course, require that an
ADR proceeding possess all the attributes of a trial. A mediation, for exam-
22. See E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 306 (1986); Paul Reidinger, Then It's Settled, A.B.A. J., July 1989, at 92. Some feel it
is undesirable for the judge who will try the case to conduct settlement conferences. For an
analysis of efficiency considerations relating to judicial intervention in settlement, see ROBERT
E. KEETON, JUDGING 198-205 (1990).
23. 771 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1985).
24. Id. at 670.
25. Id.
26. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 ("pretrial conferences; scheduling; management").
27. Kothe, 771 F.2d at 669.
28. Id. Similarly, under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court cannot
compel parties to stipulate to facts, although consideration of possible stipulations is a stated
objective of the pretrial conference rule. J.F. Edwards Const. Co. v. Anderson Safeway Guard
Rail Corp., 542 F.2d 1318, 1325 (7th Cir. 1976).
29. Situations arguably involving such a risk will be discussed infra text accompanying
notes 93-101.
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pie, encourages consideration of a much broader range of matters than
would be admissible in a trial, but this creates no irreconcilable conflict with
trial rules. A mediation simply allows the parties to determine their own
standards of relevancy in choosing to settle rather than going to a trial where
formal rules of evidence would pertain. But if the parties are required to
participate in an ADR process, it should at least provide them with the sense
of having had their "day in court." Studies indicate that litigants tend to
judge the justness of dispute proceedings not so much on whether they win
or lose, but on whether they view the process itself to have been fair.30 Re-
spect for our judicial system can only be maintained if parties who settle in
ADR proceedings later feel that they had a fair opportunity to have their say
and voluntarily choose to settle rather than going to trial. Therefore, a criti-
cal feature of the form of participation required in court-mandated ADR is
that it enable the process to provide the parties a sense of having participated
in a fair proceeding.
C. A PROCEEDING CALCULATED TO ACHIEVE ITS PURPOSES
The imposition of any ADR procedures on the parties as a prerequisite to
exercising their right to a trial must be calculated to aid in the resolution of
the dispute. Parties should not be forced to participate in costly, time-con-
suming procedures that are futile. Mandatory ADR procedures, therefore,
should be suited to developing the facts and law in a way that will enhance
the fair and efficient resolution of the case without wasted effort. If court-
annexed ADR is to be effective, it should be true to its own process goals and
values. Thus, respect for the process objectives of ADR is a necessary prin-
ciple of its integration into the litigation system. It may be necessary for
courts, at times, to alter their usual procedures in order to insure that ADR
objectives are not compromised. 31 If, however, the underlying ADR process
cannot be reconciled with the objectives of the trial-based litigation system
through accommodations in either the court or ADR procedures that do not
negate their basic values, then ADR should not be mandated. 32
D. RESPECT FOR LITIGANT AUTONOMY
Our trial system accords considerable deference to litigant autonomy over
the conduct of litigation. Litigant autonomy is respected in such matters as
choice of forum, selection of the parties, shaping of claims and defenses,
development of issues, utilization of discovery, preparation of cases, and ulti-
mate presentation before judge or jury.33 The policy underlying litigant au-
tonomy derives from the conviction that the parties are in the best position
to know the facts and appreciate their objectives and that courts are not
30. Laurens Walker, E. Allen Lind, & John Thibaut, The Relation Between Procedural
and Distributive Justice, 65 VA. L. REV. 1401, 1412-14 (1979).
31. See discussion of Decker v. Lindsey, infra text accompanying notes 98-101.
32. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.
33. See, e.g., 14 C. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3637, at 90 (2d ed. 1985) (concerning forum choice).
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well-suited to taking over the function of preparing, developing, and present-
ing cases. 34
ADR also places a high value on individual autonomy, with special em-
phasis on the empowerment of the parties to shape their own cases and solu-
tions.33 ADR processes respect the rights of the parties to shape their
arguments, articulate their interests and demands, and ultimately to agree or
not to a settlement. The commanding role of the parties in determining their
own resolution of the dispute under ADR is an important factor in explain-
ing why there is a greater compliance rate with judgments resulting from
settlement than from court-imposed decrees. 36
ADR that is court-mandated, rather than voluntary, might appear to be
inconsistent with litigant autonomy because the parties are forced to partici-
pate. However, participation in the process, as opposed to actual agreement,
must sometimes be mandated. 37 Experience shows that parties often benefit
from ADR even though their participation is not voluntary. 38 Most
mediators have encountered the situation where parties announce at the be-
ginning of the process that they are only there because they were ordered to
participate by the court or other authority and that they will not compro-
mise their positions in any way. Many of these situations still result in settle-
ments, indicating that freedom of control over the content and presentation
34. See LON. L. FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 706-07 (1949) ("The judge
must work within the framework of the parties' arguments and proof because if he goes beyond
these he will lack the guidance given him by the parties and may not understand the interests
that are affected by a decision rendered outside that framework.").
35. See FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 15, at 10. ("By definition, a consensual agree-
ment, whether reached through mediation or direct negotiation, reflects the participants' own
preferences and will be more acceptable in the long run than one imposed by a court. In the
process of mediation, participants formulate their own agreement and make an emotional in-
vestment in its success.").
36. See Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine: An
Empirical Assessment, 33 MAINE L.REv. 237 (1981); McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Small
Claims Court. Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & Soc'y REV. 11 (1984). See
also Neil Vidmar, An Assessment of Mediation in a Small Claims Court, 41 J. OF SOC. ISSUES
127 (1985); Craig A. McEwen and Richard J. Maiman, Note, The Relative Significance of
Disputing Forum and Dispute Characteristics for Outcome and Compliance, 20 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 439 (1986); Neil Vidmar, Note, Assessing the Effects of Case Characteristics and Settle-
ment Forum on Dispute Outcomes and Compliance, 21 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 155 (1987).
37. Participation in ADR is sometimes required by law. For example, mediation is re-
quired in cases involving contested child custody or visitation. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (West
Supp. 1993). Mediation is sometimes required in labor disputes. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4117.14 (1990). It can also be required in cases involving employment discrimination. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g) (1981). It may be required by government agencies or persons in author-
ity as a prerequisite to being allowed, for example, to continue to rent in low income housing;
to receive welfare or other assistance; to avoid expulsion from school; to obtain enforcement of
zoning, land use, or other governmental regulations; or to have a criminal complaint prose-
cuted. See MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note 1, at 111-1-3; ROGERS & SALEM, supra note
15, at 19-20.
38. See Jessica Pearson and Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: An Overview of Research
Results, 19 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 451 (1985); James A. Wall & Lawrence F. Schiller,
Judicial Involvement in Pre- Trial Settlement: A Judge is Not a Bump on a Log, 6 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 27 (1982). See also Craig McEwen & Thomas Milburn, Explaining a Paradox of
Mediation, 9 NEGO. J. 23 (1993) (discussing the reasons that "reluctant parties often use medi-
ation effectively and evaluate their mediation experiences positively").
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of their cases is often more important to the satisfactory operation of ADR
than whether the parties were forced initially to participate.
Procedures governing the conduct of ADR generally accord the parties
more autonomy as that is offered in a trial. In terms of what participation
should be required of parties, therefore, party autonomy requires a level of
participation consistent with the parties' freedom to present their cases, their
interests, and their demands in the manner they choose.
III. FORMS OF PARTICIPATION REQUIRED IN ADR
The four principles just discussed provide guidelines for judging what
forms of participation in ADR proceedings are compatible with the values
and objectives of the litigation system. I will focus on five frequently en-
countered forms of participation that may be required to comply with court-
ordered ADR: good faith participation; exchange of position papers and ob-
jective information; minimum meaningful participation; participation with
settlement authority; and obligation to pay the third-party neutral's fee.
A. GOOD FAITH PARTICIPATION
Over the past several years some judges in ordering parties to participate
in ADR proceedings have included a provision that they must participate in
good faith.39 A number of states have also adopted, by statute or rule, a
good faith participation requirement for mediation or ADR.4° A good faith
participation requirement is obviously premised on the belief that since
ADR is non-binding, it will be a futile exercise unless the parties engage in it
with willingness to present their best arguments and to listen to those of the
other side with an open mind.
1. Inadequacy of Case Precedents for Policy Guidance
There is remarkably little case law that examines policy issues as to the
propriety of a requirement of good faith participation in ADR. A good faith
standard first appeared in a 1983 amendment to Rule 16, the pretrial confer-
ence rule on which the authority for federal courts' annexation of ADR
processes has been based. Rule 16(f) provides for sanctions, upon motion or
a judge's own initiative, for a party's or its attorney's failing to obey a sched-
uling or pretrial order, being "substantially unprepared to participate in the
conference," or failing "to participate in good faith."'41 There have been few
reported cases on the application of the Rule 16 good faith participation
39. See, e.g., discussion of cases, infra text accompanying notes 47-51.
40. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19 § 214 (West Supp. 1992) (requiring a good
faith effort to mediate in mandatory domestic mediation); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.27 (West
1988 & Supp. 1992) (requiring good faith mediation in farm mortgage mediations with author-
ity in mediator to determine that a party is "not participating in good faith").
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(0.
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requirement. It is usually failure to appear42 or lack of preparation,43 rather
than the quality of participation, that has resulted in sanctions. That is not
surprising since a settlement conference with a judge is usually informal,
leaving both the judge and attorneys considerable leeway in how they will
participate." Only recently has there been an emphasis on attendance and
participation by the parties themselves, raising a host of new issues about
participation. 45 Thus Rule 16 precedents offer little guidance as to the scope
of the good faith participation requirement in ADR.
The recent court-annexation of ADR processes has resulted in few deci-
sions in either federal or state courts concerning required participation in
ADR, and such decisions provide little policy guidance as to what kind of
participation is required. In most cases courts have relied on Rule 16 (or an
equivalent in state courts) or on inherent judicial authority for their power to
sanction for nonparticipation. The decisions that have addressed the issue
tend to rely on narrow questions of a court's authority to make such an
order or on the appropriateness of the sanctions imposed for noncompli-
ance. 46 For example, in Decker v. Lindsey47 a Texas appellate court upheld
an order to mediate, reasoning that a court "can compel [the parties] to sit
down with each other" in a mediation and "to come together in court-or-
dered ADR procedures. '48 It struck down, however, a part of the order
that required participation in good faith, based on an interpretation of the
Texas "open courts" statute as forbidding an order that requires negotiation
when the parties prefer to go to trial. 49 In Department of Transportation v.
City of Atlanta50 the Georgia Supreme Court held that "a trial court has the
42. See Barsoumian v. Szozda, 108 F.R.D. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (sanction of $300 attor-
ney fees and $200 court costs imposed on plaintiffs attorney for failure to appear at pre-trial
conference); In re McDowell, 33 B.R. 323 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983) (default judgment entered
against defendant for failure of his lawyer to appear at pre-trial conference).
43. See Flaherty v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 109 F.R.D. 617, 618-19 (D. Mass. 1986) (sanc-
tion of payment of opposing counsel's fees and costs of preparation for pre-trial conference
entered against plaintiff's attorney who was "substantially unprepared" in not knowing her
client's injuries, medical expenses, lost earnings, or whether worker's compensation payments
had been received).
44. See R. LAWRENCE DESSEM, PRETRIAL LITIGATION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE
477-83 (1991).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 102-14.
46. Authority for imposing sanctions for noncompliance with an ADR order may come
from court rules, or from a court's inherent judicial power. There is disagreement as to what
sanctions are appropriate. In New England Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Hughes, 556 F. Supp.
712 (E.D. Pa. 1983), the court denied a right to trial de novo to a defendant who offered no
excuse for failing to appear at a court-annexed arbitration hearing. The arbitration hearing
resulted in a final plaintiff's-judgment of approximately $31,000. The court observed that
under those circumstances "the goals of the arbitration program and the authority of this
Court would be seriously undermined" if the defendant were allowed to demand a trial. Id. at
714. Cf Gilling v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 169 (D. N.J. 1988) (modifying the
sanction for nonparticipation from denial of a de novo trial to an order to reimburse the oppos-
ing party for costs incurred in preparing for arbitration); Lyons v. Wickhorst, 727 P.2d 1019
(Cal. 1986) (finding no power under state statutes to dismiss action with prejudice because of
plaintiff's failure to present evidence at arbitration proceeding).
47. 824 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
48. Id. at 250-51.
49. Id. at 251.
50. 380 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. 1989).
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authority to refer the parties to mediation," but that the order to engage in
mediation in good faith would exceed the court's authority if construed as
justifying contempt penalties if the mediation failed. 51
Other cases have determined that the applicable statute did not, in fact,
require "good faith participation." Graham v. Baker52 involved an Iowa
statute that required participation in a mediation session before a creditor
can receive a "mediation release" to undertake forfeiture proceedings in
farmer-creditor loan disputes. The creditors' attorney attended the media-
tion, but "refused to cooperate with the mediator," denied the debtors "any
opportunity to put forward their proposals for resolving the situation," was
"agitated and belligerent," and was "hostile to the [debtors], the mediator,
and the mediation process."53 The Iowa Supreme Court held that since the
statute "does not give the mediation service the power to compel either
debtor or creditor to negotiate," the creditor's attendance satisfied the mini-
mal participation required by the statute, even though the creditor stated
that his position was not negotiable.54
Some cases have simply found that the conduct did not amount to an
absence of good faith. In Halaby, McCrea & Cross v. Hoffman, 55 the Colo-
rado Supreme Court found that the trial judge had abused his discretion in
imposing sanctions on a law firm for failure to participate in a court-ordered
settlement conference in good faith.56 Without questioning the propriety of
the order, the court found that the defendant's failure to disclose that his
settlement authority was limited to $300 was not acting in bad faith. This
conclusion was based on the defendant having submitted a required confi-
dential statement to the judge setting out his position that the plaintiff's
claims were without merit and on the plaintiff having failed to ask him at the
beginning of the conference about his settlement authority. Again, the deci-
sion is of little use in determining the appropriate level of good faith partici-
pation in other situations.
2. Inadequacy of the Collective Bargaining Analogy
A possible source for policy guidance in applying the "good faith partici-
pation" requirement is collective bargaining. Under the labor laws, unions
and management that are required to engage in collective bargaining must
bargain in good faith. 7 Is that an apt analogy for ADR? Both ADR and
collective bargaining would undoubtedly benefit from the parties' good faith
participation. But there are differences in ADR which suggest that such
51. Id. at 268.
52. 447 N.W.2d 397 (Iowa 1989).
53. Id. at 398.
54. Id. at 401; see also Avril v. Civilmar, 605 So.2d 988 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (sanc-
tions not available under court-ordered mediation statute for failure to negotiate in good faith,
but only for failure to appear).
55. 831 P.2d 902 (Colo. 1992).
56. Id. at 908.
57. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3); (d) (1988).
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participation is not as critical to the process as in collective bargaining and
that the content of "good faith participation" is more difficult to determine.
First, the necessity for demanding good faith participation is less in ADR
than in collective bargaining. The failure of an ADR proceeding simply
means that the parties are relegated to their basic constitutional right to a
trial. Failure of collective bargaining, on the other hand, can have severe
social consequences - labor unrest, non-cooperation, and strikes. The fact
that there is no reasonable fall-back process after unsuccessful collective bar-
gaining underlines the importance of forcing the parties to meet a certain
level of participation.
Second, the labor laws impose positive duties on management and labor to
participate in collective bargaining that do not exist in the procedural con-
text of ADR. Negotiation in good faith is viewed as critical to labor's rights
to share in the determination of contract provisions. 8 The good faith par-
ticipation duty in collective bargaining refers to "a bilateral procedure
whereby the employer and the bargaining representative jointly attempt to
set wages and working conditions for the employees." 59 In effect, the con-
duct of the collective bargaining process itself is a playing out of the substan-
tive rights guaranteed in the labor laws.
There is no similar substantive entitlement of parties in an ADR proceed-
ing. A party has no right to force another party to accept its participation in
shaping a settlement agreement. The authority for ADR in court rules and
orders is only procedural, with express limitations on enlarging or modifying
substantive rights.6° If the ADR is not successful, it will be followed by a
trial where the parties' substantive rights can be vindicated.
The lack of a substantive entitlement in ADR makes it especially difficult
to define the content of good faith participation. Court precedents have set
out the parameters of good faith participation in collective bargaining. The
parties have an obligation to "participate actively in the deliberations so as
to indicate a present intention to find a basis for agreement."'6' This implies
''an open mind and a sincere desire to reach an agreement" and "to reach a
common ground."' 62 Among those factors that may evidence bad faith bar-
58. The Supreme Court commented in H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970):
The object of this Act was .. .to ensure that employers and their employees
could work together to establish mutually satisfactory conditions. The basic
theme of the Act was that through collective bargaining the passions, argu-
ments, and struggles of prior years would be channeled into constructive, open
discussions leading, it was hoped, to mutual agreement.
Id. at 103.
59. CHARLES MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 574 (2d. ed. 1983) (referring to
General Elec. Co., 150 NLRB 192 (1964), enforced, 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 965 (1970) (emphasis in original).
60. See The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988) (authorizing the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules of practice and procedure for federal courts, which rules "shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right"); FED. R. Civ. P. 83 (authorizing federal
district courts to make rules governing their practice, so long as "not inconsistent with these
rules").
61. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943).
62. Id.
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gaining can be Boulwarism (adopting a "take-it-or-leave-it" position),6 3 sur-
face bargaining (as in rejecting a proposal and tendering one's own without
attempting to reconcile the differences), 64 proposals that are predictably un-
acceptable, 65 failing to offer concessions of value,6 6 and demands that are
contrary to the spirit of the labor laws (for example, that the union cede
most of its rights under the Act or give the management unilateral control of
wages, hours, or working conditions).67
Many of these same factors are fairly conventional tactics used by negotia-
tors in law suits. Negotiators are not obligated to demonstrate an intent to
find a basis for agreement, or to display a sincere desire to reach common
ground, or to respond to and counter meaningfully the offers of the other
side. ADR offers a process of assisted negotiation where the parties should
be able to choose to be forthcoming and make concessions or not. To deny
them the right to take strong, or even extreme, positions (for example, that
there is no liability or that a certain sum is the only basis on which a settle-
ment is possible) would deprive them of litigant autonomy and the legitimate
right to hold out and have those issues determined in a trial. The level of
accommodation to the other side required in collective bargaining is clearly
unsuitable for ADR.
One further consideration operating against the use of the good faith par-
ticipation standard in ADR is its inherent ambiguity. Phrased in terms of
subjective intent, it seems to require an examination into a party's motives
rather than its objective conduct. Its subjectivity raises the spectre of courts
having to make complex investigations into the bargaining process of an
ADR proceeding upon any party's claim of bad faith participation by an-
other. The possibility of satellite litigation seeking sanctions for bad faith
participation could severely undermine its claim to economy and efficiency.
Sanction motions also raise difficult issues of confidentiality. Many juris-
dictions accord confidentiality to ADR.68 Proper determination of a sanc-
tion motion for bad faith participation could require the parties and the third
party neutral to testify concerning communications made during the ADR
63. General Elec. Co., 150 NLRB at 194. The name comes from a vice-president of Gen-
eral Electric who formulated the strategy of making of a "firm and fair offer" that was non-
negotiable, which was held to constitute bad faith bargaining.
64. See Neon Sign Corp., 229 NLRB 861 (1977), enforcement denied, 602 F.2d 1203 (5th
Cir. 1979); MORRIS, supra note 59, at 579-83.
65. See MORRIs, supra note 59, at 587 n.229.
66. See id. at 584, n.206.
67. See id. at 592, n.253-255.
68. Almost all states have an evidentiary exclusion rule like FED. R. EvID. 408 that ap-
plies to offers to compromise a claim in a negotiation when offered "to prove liability for or
invalidity of the claim or its amount." A number of states also grant some form of confidenti-
ality in ADR by court precedent or statute. The scope of protection varies widely, ranging
from those limited to certain kinds of ADR (e.g, labor disputes, visitation-rights mediations,
dispute resolution center mediations, etc.) to a few broad statutes applicable to all ADR (e.g.,
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.073(a) & (b) (Vernon Supp. 1993) (making confi-
dential any communication relating to the subject matter of a dispute made by a participant in
an ADR procedure). Certain matters may be excluded from protection (e.g., child abuse,
mediator malpractice claims, non-cooperation, public health or safety). See MURRAY, RAU &
SHERMAN supra note 1, at 1-22-32; Plappinger & Shaw, COURT ADR, supra note 2, at 79-100.
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proceeding. Courts would thus be faced with either rejecting confidentiality
in bad faith participation cases (thereby undermining the need to encourage
candor in ADR), or upholding confidentiality (thereby denying the parties
access to crucial evidence on the participation issue). A broad good faith
participation requirement increases the need for making this difficult confi-
dentiality choice by multiplying the occasions when parties can seek sanc-
tions based on their opponent's statements in the ADR proceeding.
3. Incompatibility with Values and Objectives of Litigation
If the ADR and collective-bargaining precedents provide little policy anal-
ysis, they do at least demonstrate that too expansive a "good faith participa-
tion" requirement may not be compatible with the four principles underlying
the values and objectives of court-mandated ADR.69 Although in a non-
binding ADR proceeding, a broad participation requirement may not be co-
ercive in the Kothe sense in which a judge attempts to impose his settlement
figure on the parties,70 the higher the level of participation required, the
greater the coercion by forcing a party to present its case in a manner not of
its choosing. This shades into an invasion of litigant autonomy by interfering
with the party's choice as to how to present its case. A legitimate claim of
litigant autonomy can be made as to those matters of case presentation as to
which the parties have superior expertise and can best perform in the inter-
ests of accuracy and efficiency.71 Under the principle of providing the
equivalent of a day in court, the good faith participation requirement could
result in a freer exchange of information and views, but, by requiring the
parties to participate as they might not have chosen to do in a trial, it does
not necessarily enhance their feeling of having had a fair proceeding. For
the equivalent of a day in court, no greater degree of participation should be
required than is needed for fairness under the ADR process (which places a
high value on litigant autonomy and lack of coercion). This shades into the
fourth principle - calculated to achieve its process purposes - which insists
that the parties not be required to perform unnecessary or futile acts that are
not reasonably likely to result in settlement. Imposing collective-bargaining
kinds of good faith requirements on the parties seems as likely to result in
satellite litigation over sanctions as to improve the possibility of settlement.
B. EXCHANGE OF POSITION PAPERS AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION
If a "good faith participation" requirement is undesirable in ADR, there
are forms of participation that would enhance the likelihood of success that
rely on objective conduct and therefore are more easily enforced by courts.
For any form of ADR to succeed, there must be some indication of the
parties' positions on the relevant issues and some exchange of basic factual
information. Requiring the parties to provide each other and the third-party
neutral with position papers and other relevant information lays a basis for
69. See supra notes 22-38 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
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meaningful consideration of the case without mandating specific forms of
presentation or interaction with the other party. It encourages further oral
participation and interaction without having to specify its form, since once
having submitted a position paper, parties and counsel are less likely to re-
fuse to discuss their positions at the ADR proceeding.
A reasonable order would be that the parties provide a position paper in
advance of the ADR proceeding which would include a plain and concise
statement of: (1) the legal and factual issues in dispute, (2) the party's posi-
tion on those issues, (3) the relief sought (including a particularized itemiza-
tion of all elements of damage claimed), and (4) any offers and counter-offers
previously made. 72 This is a shortened list of the kinds of items that are
routinely required by federal courts in proposed pretrial orders under the
authority of the Rule 16 pretrial conference rule.73
The order might also require the parties to provide to the other side in
advance, or to bring to the ADR proceeding, certain documents, such as
current medical reports or specific business records. It would thus also serve
as a discovery or subpoena order. Such an order may not be necessary if
discovery has already been conducted in the normal course of the litigation
(although updating of documents, such as medical records, is still often nec-
essary). Courts should be aware of the interplay between on-going discovery
in the case and any production provisions contained in an ADR order. The
two should be coordinated so as not to conflict. When ADR is ordered early
in the litigation before discovery, some form of abbreviated discovery may be
necessary if the ADR proceeding is to be meaningful.74 On the other hand,
there is a growing tendency for courts to stay ordinary discovery if a sched-
uled ADR proceeding could make full discovery unnecessary.75 Courts
should take care to insure that ADR not be used strategically as a vehicle to
delay or frustrate normal discovery. If a stay of discovery is granted, the
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 (a), (b), & (c). These items are culled from a larger list required by
Local Rule 235-7 of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.
73. See John T. McDermott, The Pretrial Order and McCargo v. Hedrick: Effective Man-
agement or Unproductive Formalism?, 4 JusT. Sys. J. 245 (1978); Robert F. Peckham, The
Federal Judge as A Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition,
69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981).
74. Abbreviated discovery may be accomplished by court order or agreement of the par-
ties. Consider the following description of discovery in "fast track settlement" in automobile
product liability cases:
In a fast track settlement, the plaintiff and defendant agree shortly after the
defendant has answered the lawsuit to forego formal discovery and court action
for a specified period to pursue settlement. It usually involves the plaintiff vol-
untarily producing the vehicles to the defendant for inspection and voluntarily
producing documents and other information requested by the defendant, which
it needs for its settlement evaluation.
W. Douglas Matthews & Timothy F. Lee, Identifying and Developing a Crashworthiness Case,
26 TEXAS TRIAL LAWYERS FORUM No. 4, 17, at 21 (1992).
75. See Wagshal v. Foster, 1993 WL 86499 (D.D.C. 1993) (discovery stayed pending par-
ties' resort to mandatory ADR procedure with "case evaluator"). Certain ADR processes are
expected to take place before extensive discovery. See Plappinger & Shaw, COURT ADR,
supra note 2, at 113-14 (local federal court rules ordering Early Neutral Evaluation range from
45 to 150-200 days after filing answer and ordering court-annexed arbitration from 120 to 200
days after filing answer). The timing of mediations is more variable. Id. at 114.
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court should require the ADR proceeding to take place within a reasonably
short time period.
C. MINIMAL MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION
Although exchange of position papers and objective information often
provides an alternative to mandating a specific level of participation in
ADR, there can still be a need for a minimal level of oral participation by
the parties if the process is to have a genuine hope of success. It is not easy
to fashion a term to describe what that minimal level should be because the
necessary degree of participation varies with the type of ADR process in-
volved. For want of a better term, I have adopted the language used by
some courts that require the parties to participate "in a meaningful man-
ner."' 76 Although hardly a model of certainty and precision, a "minimal
meaningful participation" standard avoids the subjectivity of "good faith
participation" by suggesting that the degree of participation required to be
"meaningful" is related to the goal of the ADR procedure. Since the meth-
odology and objectives of ADR processes vary a good deal, the "minimal
meaningful participation" standard allows flexibility of participation de-
pending on the particular process involved in each case. 77
1. Meaningful Participation Varies with Type of ADR
The distinction between "facilitative ADR," on the one hand, and "evalu-
ative" or "trial run" ADR on the other,78 is useful for judging the degree of
participation that is "meaningful" for achieving the ADR goals. "Facilita-
tive ADR," such as mediation, is the least structured process and should
require the least amount of formal participation. It is true that mediation
works best when the parties interact on all levels, and it has been argued that
"the client should be obliged respectfully to consider, and reconsider, with
the other parties or the judicial host, the positions and the interests of both
sides, and to think about ways to resolve the dispute."' 79 The trouble with
this definition of the participation requirement is that it trenches deeply on
litigant autonomy and, because of its subjectivity, would be difficult for a
court to enforce. That is not to say that parties should not be encouraged to
undertake such interactive participation as would be conducive to good me-
diation results, but that courts should not require it of them.
The objective of mediation is to get the parties to communicate in the
broad interests of settlement, and thus mediation requires at least briefly in-
76. See, e.g., W.D. TEX. R. CV-87(f)(2) (providing for "appropriate sanctions" against a
party who "fails to participate in the [court-annexed] arbitration process in a meaningful
manner").
77. A "minimal meaningful participation" requirement need not necessarily be stated in a
court's order of referral to ADR. Many courts simply order the parties to participate, and that
should normally be sufficient to inform the parties of their duties. If a party objects to the
inadequate participation of its opponent, the court may use a "minimal meaningful participa-
tion" standard to determine whether sanctions or other measures are necessary.
78. See supra note 1.
79. Leonard L. Riskin, The Represented Client in a Settlement Conference: The Lessons of
G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1059, 1114 (1991).
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dicating one's positions as to the relevant issues, listening to the other side,
and reacting to the other side's positions. Unlike "evaluative" and "trial
run" ADR processes, a comprehensive presentation of the case is not neces-
sarily required. Assuming that there is no serious disparity between the par-
ties as to opportunity to obtain information,80 they should be entitled to
provide only that information that they choose to reveal. A failure to ad-
dress or to disclose information as to all issues may suggest weakness to the
other party and lower its willingness to make offers, but that is a strategic
risk a party should be entitled to take. One objective of mediation is to iden-
tify the underlying interests of the parties in the hope of finding a solution
that satisfies both sides. Nevertheless, as in any negotiation, disguising of
true interests and bottom lines cannot be prohibited, for otherwise the courts
would be enmeshed in judging subjective negotiation behavior that could
severely abridge litigant autonomy. 81
The anti-coercion and litigation-autonomy policies underlying court-an-
nexed ADR would also contravene any requirement of affirmative offer be-
havior, such as collective bargaining-type requirements that a party make an
offer or counteroffer, avoid making predictably unacceptable offers or sur-
face bargaining, or refrain from extreme demands or inflexible positions. A
proper minimal meaningful participation requirement should be restricted to
what is essential for the mediation process, that is, that the parties state their
position(s) and listen to the other side's position(s). This might be described
in short as a requirement that the parties must "discuss settlement,"
although no specific content, other than stating and reacting to positions,
should be mandated. Thus, a lack of minimal meaningful participation
would seem to require something akin to refusal to state one's position as to
80. If one party has superior information as to critical matters, unfairness can result.
This underscores the importance of an opportunity for adequate discovery before parties are
forced to mediate. Of course, as in a trial, one side may fail to take advantage of investigative
and discovery opportunities, and the mediation process can be expected to provide no more
than a fair opportunity for advance preparation. But when parties lack key information, they
should be wary about relying on the other side for such information during the mediation
unless it can be verified. Providing misinformation (for example, a husband in a divorce medi-
ation not revealing that he has $500,000 in a Swiss bank account when division of assets is
being discussed) could be grounds for setting aside any mediated settlement for fraud. See
MURRAY, RAU & SHERMAN, supra note 1, at 374-75 ("Assuming that the nature of a media-
tion agreement would admit of judicial enforcement, enforceability is determined by reference
to contract law.... To establish the defense of misrepresentation, there must be an assertion or
omission that is not in accord with the facts, that is either fraudulent or material, and that is
justifiably relied on by the recipient in manifesting his assent."). However, confidentiality may
prevent introducing evidence of a misrepresentation made in a mediation. See supra note 68.
Thus parties and attorneys must be on guard when factual representations are made on mat-
ters as to which their information is inadequate.
81. Disguising one's true interests and bottom lines is central to negotiation. See
CHESTER L. KARRASS, THE NEGOTIATING GAME 187-91 (1970). It would be improper to try
to prohibit such behavior in ADR by court rule. Each side must recognize the possibility of
disguise, and a highly valued skill in negotiation relates to acquiring and evaluating informa-
tion from the other side. See BURLEY-ALLEN, LISTENING: THE FORGOTTEN SKILL 101-102
(1982); FOLBERG & TAYLOR, supra note 15, at 109-12. The techniques of Fisher and Ury's
"principled negotiation" are directed at enabling the parties to share enough basic information
as to interests to permit exploration of options for mutual gain. FISHER & URY, GETTING TO
YES, supra note 12, 17-98.
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critical issues (such as the central issues of liability and damages) or to listen
to the opposing party's position as to those issues. 82 Imposing any stricter
standard of participation would threaten the anti-coercion and litigant-au-
tonomy principles so important to the voluntariness ideal of mediation.
In contrast to mediation, "evaluative" forms of ADR require more partic-
ipation from a party. For a proper evaluation by a third-party neutral in
evaluative processes such as "early neutral evaluation"8 3 or "outcome deter-
minative" or "evaluative" mediation,8 4 there must be a fairly comprehensive
presentation of the issues of fact and law. An evaluation based on a sketchy
or incomplete exploration of the case risks inaccuracy and unreliability by
the evaluator. It also does a disservice to the parties who might place weight
on it, and, if they do appreciate its limitations due to inadequate presenta-
tion, it is a waste of their time and money.
Similarly, in a "trial run" ADR proceeding, a good deal more is expected
of the parties than just to talk, listen, and respond. Trial run processes con-
82. Judge Manion, dissenting in G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871
F.2d 648, 669 (7th Cir. 1989), argued that there is no meaningful distinction between requiring
"discussion" rather than "negotiation" and that requiring either is inconsistent with Rule 16
which does not permit "any coercive settlement practices." See infra notes 108-114 and ac-
companying text, for discussion of this case. There is, however, a considerable difference be-
tween requiring minimal discussion of positions and mandating that parties negotiate
according to certain content or stylistic standards.
83. The Early Neutral Evaluation (ENE) program was first created by the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California. WAYNE D. BRAZIL, Early Neutral Evaluation:
An Experimental Effort to Expedite Dispute Resolution, 69 JUDICATURE 279 (1986). It has
now been adopted in other federal courts. Under it, a neutral - ideally a respected lawyer
with expertise in the subject matter of the case - meets with parties and their lawyers for two
hours early in the litigation:
Typically, one of the clients begins a narrative presentation of the case, without
being led by the lawyer. After both sides have presented, the evaluator asks
questions. The evaluator tries to help the parties to identify common ground,
and to convert this to stipulations or informal agreements. The effort during the
process is to isolate the areas of disagreement most central to the case.
Lawyers Get Tips on Using Early Neutral Evaluation, 4 ADR REP. 124-25 (April 12, 1990).
After the discussion, the evaluator leaves the room and writes her evaluation of the liability
and damage issues in the case and two of three key analytical points. Before giving the parties
her evaluation, she may ask if they wish to discuss settlement before they see the evaluation.
Some 25% of cases settle at this point. Id. at 125. If the parties opt not to discuss settlement,
the evaluator explains her evaluation. She then "outlines a case development plan, identifying
key areas of disagreement and suggesting ways to posture the case and to conduct discovery as
efficiently as possible. The evaluator is required to do case planning. The parties are required
to listen, but not to agree. They may decide to come back for a follow-up settlement confer-
ence." Id.
84. "Outcome determinative mediation" is a recently-coined term for mediations in which
the mediator provides a ruling on the issues, which the parties can reject, but with possible
penalties if they do not do better at trial. See Proposed HB 595, Texas House of Representa-
tives (1993) (a party who rejects the mediator's determination and does not obtain a final
judgment at least 10% better than the award must pay the other party's attorney's fees and
costs incurred after the rejection). This process was one of the proposals in the Report of the
President's Council on Competitiveness, Model State Civil Multi-Door Courthouse Act
§ 2(a)(7) (1992). "Evaluative mediation" describes a mediation process in which the mediator
is expected to provide a non-binding evaluation of the case, or of certain aspects of it, based on
his experience and expertise. Mediators who have special expertise in the subject matter or
who are selected for their insight into the litigation process (such as ex-judges) tend to lean
towards a more evaluative form of mediation.
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template a presentation of each side's case to various third parties so they
can make a non-binding decision - to attorney or other expert arbitrators in
court-annexed arbitration,85 to a jury in a summary jury trial,8 6 or to the
parties' principal decision-makers in a mini-trial.8 7 For each of these
processes to provide a reasonably accurate picture of how the case might
play out if it went to trial, the parties are expected accurately to summarize
their evidence and present their best arguments. These objectives may be
jeopardized if the two sides do not provide a minimal level of formal
presentation.
The one reported decision that has considered the participation require-
ment in a "trial run" ADR process is unsatisfactory in its analysis of the
policy issues. In Gilling v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,88 a suit by a passenger
85. Court-annexed arbitration has been adopted by rule in a number of state and federal
coUrts. PATRICIA A. EBENER & DONNA R. BETANCOURT, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION:
THE NATIONAL PICTURE 2-4 (1985). In 1985, pilot programs were established in ten federal
district courts by local rule, and, in 1988, Congress authorized similar programs in ten more
districts. See MEIERHOEFER, supra note 16, at 1. Under a typical local federal rule, cases that
meet the criteria for mandatory arbitration are referred within 20 days after the answer is filed.
It is an abbreviated proceeding, usually lasting only a couple of hours, in which counsel pres-
ent a summary of their cases to an arbitrator (or three arbitrators under many of the federal
court programs). The arbitrator(s) is usually a lawyer, although such experts as architects,
engineers, accountants, or doctors could be put on an arbitration panel. Typically, counsel,
their clients, and the arbitrator(s) sit around a table, and counsel make their presentations
informally. The arbitrator's ruling is entered as a final judgment unless any party files a de-
mand for a trial de novo within a prescribed period. Sanctions may be imposed against a party
who rejects the arbitral finding, usually only the fee of the arbitrator(s) (under the federal court
programs usually $75 or $100). The moderated settlement conference operates much like
court-annexed arbitration. For a summary of this procedure, see Kimberlee K. Kovach, Mod-
erated Settlement Conference, in HANDBOOK OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 101-
116 (State Bar of Tx., 2d ed. 1990).
86. In 1981, Judge Thomas Lambros, of the federal district court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Ohio, created the "summary jury trial," which has now been adopted by rule in a
number of federal district courts. See Thomas Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other
Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1984). A number of federal courts
have local rules requiring parties to resort to a summary jury trial before going to trial. Each
side presents a summary of its case in about half a day to a jury whose verdict is only advisory.
A judge or magistrate presides. The jury is selected by the same procedures as regular juries
and is not told that their verdict is advisory. After the jury renders its verdict, counsel meet
with the judge to discuss the possibility of settlement in light of the verdict.
87. This term was attached by a newspaper story to a formal settlement device created in
1977 in connection with a corporate dispute. Ronald L. Olson, Dispute Resolution: An Alter-
native for Large Case Litigation, 6 LITIGATION, Winter 1980, at 22. The "mini-trial" was
created for disputes involving corporate parties and has been conducted primarily by private
organizations and governmental entities. It is not strictly speaking a trial at all, but a process
that combines elements of adjudication with other processes such as negotiation and media-
tion. In the proceeding, usually presided over by a neutral advisor, each side presents its case
in shortened form to the CEO's or policy makers of the parties as a prelude to settlement
negotiations between them. Then the parties negotiate, often with the participation of the
neutral advisor who may also be asked by the parties for his evaluation or opinion. See, CPR
MODEL MINITRIAL PROCEDURE (1989); ERIC GREEN, THE CPR LEGAL PROGRAM MINI-
TRIAL HANDBOOKS IN CORPORATE DISPUTE MANAGEMENT 111-14 (1981). The underlying
philosophy is to shift the responsibility for the outcome back to the clients who will negotiate
after hearing the "best case" presented by the attorneys. Some courts have annexed the pro-
cess by ordering parties to go through a mini-trial. See A Taxonomy of Judicial ADR, 9 Alter-
natives to the High Cost of Litigation 97, 107-108 (July 1991).
88. 680 F. Supp. 169 (D. N.J. 1988).
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against an airline, the parties were ordered to participate in a court-annexed
arbitration. The defense counsel presented only summaries of her position
and read a few passages from deposition testimony and answers to interroga-
tories. When asked by the arbitrator at the end of the proceeding whether
she wanted any damage award that he might make to be broken down into
compensatory and punitive damages, she said "Do what you want, or, we
don't care what you do, we won't pay it anyway."' 89 The arbitrator found
that she merely "went through the motions," rendering the proceeding "a
sham." 90 In awarding sanctions, the court deferred to the arbitrator's judg-
ment in weighing "the earnestness of the defendants' presentation against
the gravity of the plaintiffs' allegations and the defendants' potentially sizea-
ble exposure to liability" and to "his overall assessment of the meaningful-
ness of their participation." 9'
The defense counsel's refusal to make any presentation as to damages
would seem to violate a proper minimal meaningful participation require-
ment. Damages are central to a trial run form of ADR, and the arbitrator's
evaluation could be severely crippled if a party refuses entirely to present its
position or any information as to the damages issue. However, the imposi-
tion of sanctions because the defense counsel put on only summaries of her
positions and read a few portions of depositions and interrogatories is troub-
ling because it involves the court in judging just how much material must be
presented. The arbitrator's finding that she merely "went through the mo-
tions" is a subjective commentary on the level of motivation behind her pres-
entation. Litigant autonomy should allow counsel a fair degree of selective
choice in what she presents. Unless the portions of depositions and interrog-
atories that she read were irrelevant or failed completely to address the is-
sues in the case, 92 the court should not have determined, on that basis alone,
that she did not satisfy the participation standard. Even in a trial run pro-
cess, a party or his attorney should be allowed to sift and choose what is to
be presented without risk of sanction.
It appears that the arbitrator was especially angered by the fact that the
defense counsel was contemptuous of the process. However, sanctions based
on the attitude of the participant seem highly undesirable. There may be
some point at which a party or counsel is so abusive of the other party or the
neutral third-party, or so contemptuous in its behavior, that a court's sanc-
tion power should be invoked. It does not appear that that point was
reached here. Any attempt to tightly monitor the quality and spirit of coun-
sel's participation ultimately undercuts the values and objectives of court-
89. Id. at 170.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 171.
92. They do not seem to have been so. The arbitrator stated: "While she may have read a
few interrogatories and answers [sic] a few lines from one or more deposition transcripts,
ninety five percent (95%) of her participation was in fact stating position summaries on behalf
of Eastern, and stating fact summaries as to what Eastern's personnel may have said in their
own depositions." Gilling, 680 F. Supp. at 170.
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mandated ADR and presents an unsatisfactory prospect of satellite
litigation.
2. Required Participation Should Not Interfere with Trial Strategy
Consistency with the objectives of court-mandated ADR requires that a
minimal meaningful participation standard not materially interfere with the
parties' ultimate ability to present their cases to a jury. Two prominent cases
have wrestled with situations where parties refused to comply with ADR
orders because they feared that they would jeopardize their strategic position
in a trial. These cases demonstrate that such claims are easily made and
must be carefully scrutinized by courts. They also indicate that courts can
sometimes take procedural steps that will allay a party's strategic concerns
with participation.
In Strandell v. Jackson County, Illinois,93 the plaintiff's attorney, in a case
involving arrest, strip search, imprisonment, and suicidal death, appeared as
ordered for a summary jury trial, but refused to proceed with the selection of
the jury. He argued that participation in the trial would force him to dis-
close privileged attorney work product. He had obtained statements from
twenty-one witnesses, which had been denied to the defendants on a motion
to compel after discovery had closed on the ground that they had failed to
establish the substantial need and undue hardship required to overcome the
qualified work product immunity. 94 The Sixth Circuit found that the plain-
tiff's participation in the summary jury trial would "affect seriously the well-
established rules concerning discovery and work-product privilege" and va-
cated the lower court's judgment of contempt for refusal to participate.95
This reasoning does not hold up under scrutiny. The plaintiff's attorney
was not required to put on any specific evidence in the summary jury trial.
Given due regard for litigant autonomy, he would certainly have been enti-
tled, for example, to hold back the work-product evidence for sole use at
trial. Of course, that could mean that he would not do as well with the
summary jury as he hoped he would do at trial. But that is a strategic choice
he had to make - either hold back his work-product and possibly weaken
93. 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988). For discussion of this case, see James J. Alfini, Sum-
mary Jury Trials in State and Federal Courts: A Comparative Analysis of the Perceptions of
Participating Lawyers, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 213 (1989); Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.,
The Future of Summary Jury Trials in Federal Courts: Strandell v. Jackson County, 21 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 455 (1988); Shirley A. Wiegand, A New Light Bulb or the Work of the
Devil? A Current Assessment of Summary Jury Trials, 69 OR. L. REV. 87, 93 (1990); Note,
Compelling Alternatives: The Authority of Federal Judges to Order Summary Jury Trial Partici-
pation, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 483, 490 (1988); Note, Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury
Trial: Guidelines for Ensuring Fair and Effective Processes, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1090
(1990).
94. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
95. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888. The Seventh Circuit also found that Rule 16's provision
for pretrial conferences "was not intended to require that an unwilling litigant be sidetracked
from the normal course of litigation" and did not authorize a mandatory summary jury trial.
Id. at 887. However, lower courts in other jurisdictions have explicitly rejected Strandell, and
federal legislation has now approved of mandatory summary jury trials in federal courts. See
Arabian American Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988); McKay v. Ashland
Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988); 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (West Supp. 1992).
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his case in the summary jury trial, or risk all on the trial. Since the summary
jury trial is non-binding, all he risked was an adverse summary jury trial
verdict that might conceivably weaken his bargaining position for settlement
before trial. Putting him to this choice would not seem unfair given the
reasonable settlement objective of the summary jury trial.
The concern in Strandell of interfering with discovery privileges is more
troubling but also seems misplaced. Because discovery had been closed,
plaintiffs claimed a right not to have to disclose the statements prior to trial.
But this was only a temporary strategic interest that would come to an end
at the latest at trial.96 Closure dates can be extended by the court, and,
whether or not the court might have done so here, the plaintiff would still
have had to reveal the statements if he wanted to use them at trial. Putting
him to the choice of using them or not at the summary jury trial, depending
on which strategic advantage he wanted to preserve, does not seem an undue
interference with discovery privilege doctrine. 97
Decker v. Lindsay 98 provides another example of a party's refusal to par-
ticipate in ADR. Unlike Strandell, the appellate court upheld the
mandatory order, a decision which, upon analysis, seems to be "the right
thing for the wrong reason." The trial judge referred the case to mediation
on her own motion. Plaintiff's counsel objected on a number of grounds,99
including that he could not participate in the mediation because it would
jeopardize his Stowers position.'°0 The plaintiff had sent a "Stowers letter"
to the defendant offering to settle within policy limits, which was refused.
Plaintiff maintained that his Stowers position could be jeopardized if he were
forced to participate in a mediation. This was apparently based on the con-
cern that any willingness by plaintiff in a mediation to consider lesser offers
96. The work-product privilege only protects the form in which the evidence has been
taken (in this case written statements from witnesses) and not the content. See Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512 (1947) (denial of statements under work product privilege "does not
mean that any material, non-privileged facts can be hidden").
97. See Charles R. Richey, Rule 16: A Survey and Some Considerations for the Bench and
Bar, 126 F.R.D. 599, 609 (1989) ("The disclosure of information at a summary jury trial in no
way prejudices a participant, as the information would ultimately be disclosed at trial any-
way."); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, 859 F.2d 1007, 1017 (1st Cir. 1988)
("Requiring preidentification merely moves up the schedule, accelerating disclosures which
would inevitably take place.").
98. 824 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); see discussion supra
notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
99. The plaintiff argued that the Texas Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures Act
§§ 154.021 & .022 (allowing a court to refer a pending dispute to an ADR procedure, but not
permitting referral if the court finds "a reasonable basis" for a party's objection,which must be
filed within 10 days after referral to ADR) did not allow referral without consent of all parties.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 154.021 &.022. The court rejected this argument.
100. Under the Texas Stowers decision, a plaintiff may make an offer to settle within policy
limits and if the insurer (which has control over the conduct of the defense) refuses to do so,
and an eventual jury verdict against defendant exceeds policy limits, the insurer may be liable
to pay the insured the excess of the judgment over policy limits, if an ordinarily prudent person
would have settled it. G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co., 15 S.W.2d 544
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved). The insured frequently assigns his rights
against the insurance company to the plaintiff after a judgment in excess of policy limits.
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than his previous policy-limits offer might be used by the insurer to show
that its refusal of the policy-limits offer was not unreasonable.
The appellate court rejected this argument on the ground that there had
not yet been a trial and plaintiff had not yet established Stowers rights. This
is a formalistic explanation that ignored the fact that plaintiff did have a
genuine legal interest, although future and contingent, that might entitle him
to recover above policy limits against the defendant's insurance company. A
better justification would have been that although plaintiff had established a
potential Stowers position (if defendant continued in the future to reject set-
tlement offers within policy limits), this gave him no right to refuse to try to
settle the case short of trial. The "Stowers doctrine" was directed at an in-
surance company's failure to settle in good faith, but would not seem to
entitle a plaintiff to lock in for all time an early refusal to settle within policy
limits as bad faith, with no obligation on plaintiff's part to engage in further
negotiations to try to achieve a settlement. Thus a balancing of the policy
underlying the Stowers doctrine with the ADR policy of encouraging settle-
ment would justify requiring plaintiff to participate in this case.
One problem with this conclusion is that plaintiff, being forced to attend
the mediation, might still be unwilling to make any offers for fear of jeopard-
izing his Stowers position. If, however, the trial court had been sensitive to
the problem, there are procedural steps it might have taken to allay the
plaintiff's concerns. First, it could have conditioned its mediation order on
the defendant's waiving any objection to plaintiff's Stowers position that
could result from participation in the mediation. This would have given the
plaintiff the incentive to participate freely, without fear of losing his Stowers
position. Second, the court might have made a determination that plaintiff's
Stowers rights would not be at risk because of mediation confidentiality. The
broad Texas ADR confidentiality provision forbids disclosure of any com-
munication made in an ADR proceeding,10 1 and thus defendant could not
have relied on what plaintiff said or did in the mediation to prove that its
refusal of the policy-limits offer was not unreasonable. This determination
would have allowed the plaintiff to participate in the mediation without risk
of jeopardizing his Stowers position if settlement were not achieved. These
are the sorts of determinations and accommodations that courts should be
willing to consider when ADR participation orders are claimed to trench
unduly on parties' strategic interests.
D. OBLIGATION TO ATTEND WITH SETTLEMENT AUTHORITY
Court orders that the parties participate in ADR proceedings often pro-
vide that they must attend with "full authority to settle the case" and, in the
case of a corporate party or governmental body, that a representative attend
who has authority to settle. Such orders raise questions, first, as to what
persons are included when parties are ordered to attend, and, second, as to
what kind of settlement authority the parties and/or attorneys must have.
101. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 154.073(a) & (b); see supra note 68.
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1. Mandatory Client Attendance
The conviction that it is essential for the parties to attend settlement pro-
ceedings has been relatively late in coming. The original pretrial conference
rule (Rule 16), promulgated in 1937, authorized federal courts only to "di-
rect the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a conference."' 10 2 In
1983 it was amended to include, in addition to the attorneys, "any unrepre-
sented parties."' 0 3 Increasingly, however, courts have come to the conclu-
sion that attendance of the parties themselves, whether represented by
counsel or not, increases the possibility of success of both settlement confer-
ences and newly emerging ADR proceedings.
Professor Riskin has made an examination of the advantages and disad-
vantages of client attendance that offers useful guidance for courts. 14 Ad-
vantages include giving the client a chance to tell his story in his own words,
learning about the strengths and weaknesses of both sides, permitting him to
act on new information, allowing cooperation and momentum to build in the
offer process, clearing up miscommunications about facts and interests be-
tween lawyers and clients, and providing the information to spot opportuni-
ties for problem-solving solutions.' 0 5 Disadvantages include the risk that
the client may give away valuable information that could leave him vulnera-
ble to exploitation or weaken his case, that exposure to the other side's be-
havior will anger or harden some clients, or that direct communication will
cause a flare-up and loss of objectivity.106
On balance, required attendance of individual parties at ADR proceedings
is consistent with the four principles of court-mandated ADR.10 7 Client
participation reduces coercion by providing full information to the person
who must ultimately decide whether to settle and enhances litigant auton-
omy by allowing the client to participate in the presentation of his own case.
It strengthens the feeling of the parties that they have had their day in court.
Its compatibility with the ability of the ADR process to achieve its objec-
tives varies with the process. It is certainly consistent with the objectives of
"facilitative" ADR by including the client as an active participant in search-
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a), original text contained in 3 JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 16.01[5] (2d ed. 1993).
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a), as amended, 1983. The MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
365 (2d ed. 1985) provides in its Sample Order Setting Initial Conference: "Each party repre-
sented by counsel shall appear through its attorney who will have primary responsibility for its
interests in this litigation. Parties not represented by counsel are expected to appear in person
or through a responsible officer."
104. Riskin, The Represented Client in a Settlement Conference, supra note 79.
105. Id. at 1099-1102.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1107 n.167. Riskin concludes that client attendance is more likely to be useful
in an ADR process that has such features as "participatory lawyer-client relationships, prob-
lem-solving negotiation, and judicial interventions emphasizing facilitation rather than pres-
sure." Id. at 1106. He recommends that the "judicial host" in a settlement conference should
"1. routinely require attendance of represented clients, and representatives of organizational
clients with full settlement authority, in the absence of a suitable, and suitably presented objec-
tion, and 2. take appropriate measures to ensure that the client's presence is worthwhile to the
client." Id. at 1106-07.
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ing for solutions. It may not be as important in "evaluative" or "trial run"
ADR, as the attorney usually plays the key role in summarizing and present-
ing the case, but the client can often add a critical aspect to both the case
presentation and the negotiation that is expected to follow.
An exception to this analysis is when a named party has no real interest in
the case. This frequently arises in personal-injury or property-damage cases
filed against a fully insured defendant. Under standard insurance policy pro-
visions, the insurance company has sole authority over the defense of cases,
including whether to settle or go to trial. The insurance company represen-
tative, therefore, is the crucial person on the defense side for settlement ne-
gotiations. The insured defendant may have some interest in the case since
its conduct is in question, but determination of that issue may have no mone-
tary consequences to it. Most insured defendants are content to leave settle-
ment matters to the insurance company, with no interest in devoting time
and emotional capital to participating in settlement negotiations. An appro-
priate court order, therefore, would not require an insured defendant to at-
tend when it has no realistic exposure over policy limits and when its
consent to settle is not required. It is quite different, however, if there is any
realistic possibility of recovery against the defendant above policy limits.
The paradigm example arises when a plaintiff offers to settle within policy
limits in a state that provides for recovery against an insurance company for
bad faith failure to settle. As demonstrated in the Decker case, the defend-
ant has a significant interest to preserve in the settlement negotiations, and,
in fact, its desire to escape exposure by having the insurance company settle
within policy limits may provide an interesting dynamic in the settlement
proceedings.
Difficult questions also arise when the client is not an individual but a
corporation. A broad range of issues in this context was explored by a Sev-
enth Circuit en banc decision, G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Joseph Oat
Corp.108 The court members obviously found the issues intriguing, writing
six separate majority and dissenting opinions. The case arose out of a magis-
trate's order that the defendant send a "corporate representative with au-
thority to settle" to a settlement conference. The majority upheld the order,
rejecting the defendant's contention that it was unreasonable to impose on
the company the expense and burden of requiring its president "to leave his
business [in Camden, New Jersey] to travel to Madison, Wisconsin, to par-
ticipate in a settlement conference."' ' 09 The majority conceded that circum-
stances could arise in which requiring a corporate representative to appear
"would be so onerous, so clearly unproductive, or so expensive in relation to
the size, value, and complexity of the case that it might be an abuse of discre-
tion. °10 However, it found no such situation here, where the claim was
sizable ($4 million) and turned on complex factual and legal issues, where
108. 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc). The issues, however, were couched in terms
of a court's power, under Rule 16, to order the attendance of a corporate representative with
settlement authority.




the trial was expected to be lengthy (one to three months), and where the
corporation had sent an attorney from Philadelphia to speak for the princi-
pals, whose expenses would not have exceeded sending a corporate represen-
tative from Camden.
Judge Posner, dissenting, expressed the concern "that in their zeal to set-
tle cases judges may ignore the value of other people's time." '111 "One rea-
son people hire lawyers is to economize on their own investment of time in
resolving disputes," and, in this instance, defendant "didn't want its execu-
tives' time occupied with this litigation."'1 12 Posner conceded that
"[a]ttorneys often are imperfect agents of their clients," and he left open the
question whether, under Rule 16, there are circumstances in which a party
represented by counsel can be compelled to attend a pretrial conference.' 13
Judge Posner's point is well taken. There surely are circumstances when
an attorney can adequately represent a party and when requiring a non-at-
torney representative is unnecessarily wasteful. The majority opinion, how-
ever, also recognized this, and the factors it cited reasonably support its
conclusion that a party representative was needed in this case. There should
be no fixed rule either way as to party representative attendance; the effi-
ciency and proportionality considerations identified by the majority provide
appropriate guidance for case-by-case determinations (for example, in a low-
value case a court should be more willing to accept a local attorney as a
party's representative).
Judge Easterbrook, also dissenting, added a further consideration. Many
firms send their lawyer to negotiate in collective bargaining or merger talks,
he observed, and a lawyer is no less suited to negotiating in a settlement
conference.' 4 But this too depends on the particular circumstances. ADR
places great importance on having in attendance the person who will make
the ultimate decision to settle so that he can hear, see, and participate in the
proceedings, thus being capable of being affected by the discussion and inter-
action with the other side. Thus, if a lawyer is the sole representative she
should be essentially the alter ego of the corporate decision-maker(s), with
the same knowledge, reactions, interests, and settlement authority as he has.
The very role of lawyers as legal advisors with independent professional du-
ties and standards suggests that they are often not a suitable alter ego and
that the party representative himself should attend. Although anti-coercion
and litigant-autonomy policies favor honoring the party's choice of a repre-
sentative, a court should be entitled to determine that the day-in-court and
promotion-of-ADR-settlement objectives cannot be served by the sole at-
tendance of an attorney.
2. Scope of Settlement Authority
Courts also routinely include in ADR orders a requirement that the par-
111. Id. at 657.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 657-58.
114. Id. at 663.
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ties and counsel come to the proceeding with settlement authority.11 5 This is
based on the frequent experience that a settlement is less likely to be
achieved if persons not in attendance must approve the settlement agreed
upon. Coming without full settlement authority has also been seen as an
illegitimate tactic used by parties, particularly insurance companies, to allow
the negotiator to claim inability to bargain outside of a prescribed range and
to allow absent officials to disavow agreements made by their negotiating
representative as outside their authority.' 1 6
Lockhart v. Patel'17 provides an extreme example of an insurance com-
pany's noncompliance with such an order. After a non-binding summary
jury trial that awarded the plaintiff $200,000 for a lost eye in a medical mal-
practice case, the plaintiff agreed to settle for $175,00, but the attorney for
the doctor's insurer told the judge he was only authorized to offer $125,000
and not to negotiate any further. The judge then called a settlement confer-
ence, directing the defense attorney to bring the home-office representative of
the insurance company who had issued these instructions and a representa-
tive with equal authority. He said: "Tell them not to send some flunky who
has no authority to negotiate. I want someone who can enter into a settle-
ment in this range without having to call anyone else." 18
The defense attorney brought an adjuster from the local office who ad-
vised the court that her instructions from the home office were to reiterate
the previous offer "and not to bother to call them back if it were not ac-
cepted."'11 9 The judge then made findings that the insurer "had deliberately
refused to obey the order of the court," 120 striking the pleadings of the de-
fendant, declaring him in default, and ordering a show cause hearing why
the insurer should not be punished for criminal contempt. Later that day,
the insurer settled for $175,000. At the contempt hearing, the judge ac-
cepted the assurances of the insurer that "it had all been a misunderstand-
ing" and permitted it to purge itself with a letter of apology from its Chief
Executive Officer. 121
Lockhart is an appropriate fact situation for sanctions. Defendant's re-
fusal to send a representative with any settlement authority at all, other than
115. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton International Airport, 720 F. Supp.
1433, 1441 (D.Colo. 1988) (settlement conference order that "Representatives of all parties,
with full settlement authority, shall attend the settlement conference and participate fully in all
negotiations. The court expressly notes that the presence of counsel of record does not fulfill
the requirement of the presence of an individual with settlement authority.").
116. See CHESTER L. KARRASS, GIVE AND TAKE: THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO NEGOTI-
ATING STRATEGIES AND TACTICS 96-97 (1974) ("Limited authority is a source of power. A
man is generally better off if he doesn't have full authority.... A negotiator with limits can
prove to be tough. He can say 'no' gracefully. It is never he who says 'no' but somebody or
something else .... If you challenge my lack of authority by bumping the problem upward,
other apprehensions set in. Now you must take on my boss or my boss's boss or the legal
counsel, all of whom represent new status relationships....
117. 115 F.R.D. 44 (E.D. Ky. 1987).






to reiterate the previous offer, insured that the conference would be a futile
proceeding. Requiring settlement authority does not coerce a party into set-
tling for any specific amount, and litigant autonomy cannot justify ignoring
a requirement directed at avoiding wasteful negotiation tactics.
The hard cases arise when the representative's settlement authority is
more ambiguous than in Lockhart. Assume that an insurance company
sends a representative with authority to settle only up to $10,000, on the
basis that it has thoroughly reviewed the case and is convinced that there is
no liability at all and, that, in any event, the reasonable damages are much
smaller than that amount. Surely the company should not be required to
give its representative authority to settle at a higher amount when it has
concluded that there is no justification for doing so. But the key inquiry is
what the representative's instructions are. If he is sent without authority to
consider any settlement above $10,000, this is essentially a "no authority"
case as in Lockhart. A court should be entitled to require that the represen-
tative at least be open to hearing the arguments of the other side with the
possibility of settling at any amount found to be persuasive, even though the
representative understands that the company has evaluated the case as not
worth more than $10,000. If his authority and instructions are so limited
that he is deaf to any persuasion, then he is not the proper representative
with adequate authority that the court has ordered.
A further question, however, is whether the representative must himself
possess full authority to settle. Would it be sufficient to have a representa-
tive at the regional office with broader settlement authority be available by
phone? What is troubling with this approach is that the person with the
ultimate authority cannot be subjected to the discussion that takes place in
the settlement conference, thus undermining the effectiveness of the process.
On the other hand, requiring the representative to be the person with ulti-
mate settlement authority can impose enormous burdens on that official's
time or force her to delegate the authority further down the line than she
finds it prudent to do.
G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corp. wrestled with these
issues. The majority upheld the magistrate's order that the defendant send a
"corporate representative with authority to settle" on the ground that it did
not require coming to court "willing to settle on someone else's terms," but
only "to consider the possibility of settlement."'' 22 It interpreted the term
"authority to settle" as meaning only that the corporate representative "was
required to hold a position within the corporate entity allowing him to speak
122. 871 F.2d at 653. Judge Posner dissented on the ground that requiring "full settlement
authority" was different from merely demanding that "a party who has not closed the door to
settlement send an executive to discuss possible terms." Id. at 658. It is only defensible, he
said, if a party has a duty to bargain in good faith, which he contended Rule 16 does not
impose. He thus viewed the combination of the full settlement authority requirement and the
good faith bargaining requirement as coercing the defendant into settling at some amount.
This seems to be a misreading of "good faith participation" as requiring affirmative offer be-
havior. The majority's description of the duty imposed - to be able to speak definitively and
to commit to a particular position - is far removed from coercing a party to settle at a specific
settlement figure.
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definitively and to commit the corporation to a particular position in the
litigation." 123
Judge Easterbrook's dissenting opinion raised the concern that such a re-
quirement invades the decision-making autonomy of the corporation. He
concluded that the magistrate found the corporation's attorney was "inade-
quate only because he was under instructions not to pay money."12 4 This
suggests, he said, that even the corporation's CEO would have been an inad-
equate representative if he had instructions from his board to settle without
paying cash and to bring back for the board's consideration any financial
proposals. He pointed out that most corporations reserve the power to agree
and that their negotiating representatives only have the "power to discuss
and recommend."125
Should a corporation (or a governmental body which can only act by the
vote of a governing group) be required to rearrange its structure in order to
give its negotiator full settlement authority? The answer would seem to de-
pend on whether the authority-structure is reasonable (or required by law)
and whether it can be accommodated by reasonable procedures to permit the
negotiating representative to obtain ultimate approval. Normally, it would
appear, a company should not be able to avoid sending a person with settle-
ment authority just because it wants to limit that authority to someone
higher up who cannot attend. It seems reasonable to expect the representa-
tive to be a person with suitable authority and discretion to engage in mean-
ingful bargaining. 126 Professor Riskin suggests that an ideal representative
would be one "whose attributes approached, as closely as feasible, those of
an individual litigant," and that "a representative with two or three of them
ordinarily would satisfy my notion of full settlement authority.1' 2 7
How should a court treat governmental entities which are subject to inter-
nal regulations or statutory limitations that restrict settlement authority to
high-level officials? In In re Stone, 128 federal agencies and entities (including
the Internal Revenue Service and Government National Mortgage Associa-
tion) sought to mandamus a federal district judge from enforcing a standing
order that required the federal government to send a representative with
"full settlement authority" to settlement conferences. U.S. Attorneys may
settle cases up to $500,000; if the client agency disagrees with the U.S. Attor-
ney as to terms of settlement an Assistant Attorney General must approve
the settlement; and settlements in classes of important cases must always be
approved by the Deputy Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney Gen-
123. Id.
124. Id. at 663-64.
125. Id. at 664.
126. A model Order of Referral to Mediation recommended to judges by the Standing
ADR Committee of the Texas State Bar Association provides that "each organization or
agency party shall be represented by an officer or representative with authority and discretion
to negotiate a settlement." 2 ALTERNATIVE RESOLS. 11 (Winter 1992).
127. Riskin, supra note 79, at I 110-11.
128. 986 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
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eral. The government argued that a court may never compel the Depart-
ment of Justice to alter its settlement-authority regulations.
The Fifth Circuit disagreed, but cautioned that courts "must consider the
unique position of the government as a litigant." 129 It found that the pur-
pose of the AG's regulations was to promote centralized decisionmaking on
important questions; this serves the important objectives of allowing the gov-
ernment to act consistently, to pursue policy goals more effectively by plac-
ing authority in the hands of a few officials, and to promote political
accountability. It concluded that, given these reasonable policy justifications
and the insignificant interference with the operation of courts by respecting
these regulations, the standing order was an abuse of discretion as applied in
the particular cases involved.' 30
The Fifth Circuit opinion went on to recommend that district courts take
"a practical approach" to imposing settlement-authority requirements and
consider "less drastic steps" before requiring the attendance of an official
with ultimate settlement-authority.13 ' It suggested, for example, that a
court could require the government to declare whether a case could be set-
tled within the local U.S. Attorney's authority, and, if so, require him to
attend or be available by telephone. A court could also take such actions as
requiring the government to advise it who has settlement authority and then
advising such person in advance of the conference to consider settlement and
be fully prepared and available by telephone to discuss settlement at the time
of the conference. Only if such lesser measures fail, should a court resort to
requiring the attendance of the official with full settlement authority. 32
This appears to be a reasonable approach to the problem of governmental
representation at ADR proceedings, although it accords greater deference to
the government than courts have been willing to accord to corporations and
private business entities.
A further problem encountered by governmental entities can arise from
statutory requirements that assign decision-making authority to a group
(such as a governing board or commission, a city council, or county commis-
sioners). In such situations, all that can be reasonably expected of a repre-
sentative in a settlement conference or ADR proceeding is that he be given
tentative authority to negotiate on behalf of the entity without imposing arti-
ficial limitations that would close his mind to persuasion. Approval by the
group could, in some situations, be sought immediately by requiring the
members to be available by phone, or, where decision-making must be made
in an open meeting (as with governmental bodies under certain open meet-
ings statutes) 33 by requiring a meeting within a short period of time after
129. Id. at 903.
130. Id. at 904.
131. Id. at 905.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., the Texas Open Meeting Act, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17
(Pamp. 1993), § l(a), defining a meeting that must be open as "any deliberation between a
quorum of members," and § 2(1), requiring any final settlement of a suit to be made in an open
meeting.
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the conclusion of the ADR proceeding.
E. PARTIES' OBLIGATION TO PAY MEDIATOR'S FEE
A necessary consideration in court-ordered ADR is who will pay for the
third-party neutral. The problem normally arises only with mediation since
courts generally pay for the neutrals in court-administered processes such as
early neutral evaluation, court-annexed arbitration, and summary jury trial.
Most courts do not have funds for payment of mediators13 4 and therefore
require the parties to bear the cost, analogizing a mediator to special masters
and other judicial surrogates like guardians ad litem whose fees are assessed
against the parties. The plaintiffs in Decker objected to being ordered to pay
for the mediator, but the appellate court observed that the Texas ADR stat-
ute 135 allows the court to set a "reasonable fee" for the services of an impar-
tial third party, concluding that it "certainly allows a reasonable fee to be
charged." 136
The difficult issue is what is a "reasonable fee." Complaints of very large
mediator's fees, in the thousands of dollars per day, have been raised in some
states.1 37 There is also a question as to whether the parties must accept a
court-appointed mediator and his fee schedule, or whether they may use an-
other mediator, including one from a community-based low-fee or non-fee
service. The policies underlying court-mandated ADR would seem to be
best satisfied by according the parties a role in the selection of a mediator, so
that they can consider both his qualifications and fees in making the selec-
tion.1 38 Only when this is not feasible due to time constraints should courts
appoint a mediator without consulting with the parties in advance. Money
often becomes an important consideration in procedural matters, and court's
insensitivity to this issue can undermine support for ADR in the bar and the
community at large.
IV. CONCLUSION
Court-mandated ADR is presently going through growing pains. Courts
have embraced ADR for a variety of reasons, not all of them consistent with
the principle of voluntariness that underlies non-binding ADR processes. In
134. California, however, mandates conciliation for issues of child custody or visitation as a
prerequisite to a divorce trial, and conciliation counsellors are provided by the court. See CAL.
CIV. CODE ANN. § 4607 (West Supp. 1993).
135. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 154.054(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
136. Decker, 824 S.W.2d at 250.
137. See Richard Connelly, Mediation Law Loses Some Leverage, TEXAS LAW., Jan. 20,
1992, 1, at 32. ("Mediators [in Houston] have consistently waived their fees in the past when-
ever a challenge was made to court-ordered mediation.").
138. This could be accomplished by giving the parties a brief period of time to select a
mediator, or by providing them a list of qualified mediators from which to choose. with the
court making the selection if they fail to do so. See the proposed Order of Referral to Media-
tion of the ADR Committee of the Texas State Bar Association, 2 ALTERNATIVE RESOLS. I I
(Winter 1992) (parties ordered to confer and within ten business days may submit an agreed
order nominating a mediator, but meanwhile naming a mediator who will be appointed in
default of the parties' agreement).
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implementing mandatory ADR orders, court-imposed requirements as to
participation should be carefully scrutinized to insure their compatibility
with the ADR process involved. A "good faith participation" requirement
is not compatible with the objectives of court-annexed ADR and risks satel-
lite litigation over sanctions that is inimical to effective and efficient settle-
ment. In contrast, participation requirements for the exchange of position
papers and objective information enhance the settlement process without un-
duly interfering with litigant autonomy. Similarly, a "minimal meaningful
participation" standard that requires only such participation as is needed to
prevent frustration of the objectives of the particular ADR process is consis-
tent with the role of ADR in the litigation system. Requirements for attend-
ance of parties and persons with adequate authority and discretion are also
critical to the settlement function of court-annexed ADR, but must be ap-
plied pragmatically to protect against unnecessary expense and inconven-
ience. Cautious use of courts' power to mandate ADR is necessary both for
public support and to insure compatibility with the objectives of ADR as an
integral part of the litigation system.
